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Abstract: Customers expect companies to provide clear health-related information 
for the products they purchase in a big data environment. Organic food is 
data-enabled with the organic label, but the certification cost discourages the 
small-scale suppliers from certifying their product, which makes the product 
satisfying the organic standard regarded as conventional product. By considering the 
trade-off between the profit gained from organic label and additional certification cost, 
this paper investigates an organic food supply chain where a leading retailer procures 
from two suppliers with different brands. Customers care about both the brand-value 
and quality (more specifically, organic or not) when purchasing the product. We 
explore the organic certification and wholesale pricing strategies for suppliers, and the 
supplier selection and retail pricing strategies for the retailer. We find that when two 
suppliers adopt asymmetric certification strategy, the retailer tends to procure the 
product with organic label. The supplier without a brand name can compensate by 
organic certification, which can even obtain more profits than the rival. As the risk of 
being quitted by the retailer increases, the supplier without a brand name is more 
eager than the rival to obtain the organic label. However, two suppliers will fall into a 
prisoner’s dilemma with low health utility from organic label and high certification 
cost if they both certify the product. 
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According to Blueweave Consulting & Research Pvt Ltd, the global organic food 
market is expected to grow at a CAGR over 15% during 2018-2026 in terms of dollar 
value, and health is among one of the main factors inducing customers’ organic food 
purchase intention 1 . Since globalization has brought many positive changes to 
developing countries (Cui and Song, 2019; Feng et al., 2019) and sustainable 
development (Cui and Huang, 2018), growth in organic farming in developing 
countries was mainly based on increasing exports of organic food to developed 
countries (Parrott et al., 2007). Many researchers show that health constitutes one of 
the principal purchasing motives for organic food (Bauer et al., 2013; Vega-Zamora et 
al., 2014; Popa et al., 2018; Sazvaret et al., 2018), particularly because of its 
wholesomeness and absence of chemicals (Schifferstein and Ophuis, 1998). 
Health-conscious customers are also more likely to consume organic food (Chen, 
2007; DeMagistris and Gracia, 2008; Goetzke et al., 2014; Filippini et al., 2018). 
The question of health is influenced by a lack of information, and the marketing 
strategies adopted by companies which bring about an increase in the information 
asymmetry between producers and customers (Marotta et al., 2014). Dabbert et al. 
(2014) think that the organic quality of a product is rooted in the production process 
rather than in any measurable quality of the product that could be experienced or 
directly observed before the product is purchased. Big data is emerging as an 
important information technology to guide decisions within agri-food supply chains 
(Ahearn et al., 2016), and big data applications in farming can alleviate food security 
concerns (Chen et al., 2014). Organic certification schemes require extensive product 
and process information, the traceability system related to big data is increasingly 
applied to evaluate the authenticity of organic product samples (Barbosa et al., 2014; 
Barbosa et al., 2016). Meanwhile, big data revolution reshapes the way customers and 
producers think about and make decisions regarding food purchases and production 





practices, and customers expect companies to provide clear, accurate and useful 
food-related information for the products they purchase (Pollard et al., 2019). Since 
the organic label acts as an indicator of healthfulness, a food with an organic label 
tends to be perceived as more healthful than the same food without such a label 
(Schifferstein and Ophuis, 1998; Lee et al., 2013; Ellison et al., 2016).  
For producers who conduct organic practices, the decision to certify or not is 
based on their perception of the costs and benefits of organic certification. Barrett et al. 
(2002) point out that international certification and inspection can be very expensive 
for suppliers in developing countries. Veldstra et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
certification costs might discourage farmers from becoming certified. In their study, 
71% of those who use any organic practices choose not to certify. Other research has 
shown that large farms tend to certify while small farms do not (Klonsky and Tourte, 
1998). Snider et al. (2017) find that low customer demand, high auditing and 
certification costs, and weak financial incentives encourage cooperative to certify 
individual members rather than all members. Clark et al. (2016) also think that most 
agricultural certification initiatives are private initiatives that are costly for 
small-producers with limited access to capital. In China, many agricultural product 
suppliers sell wild and native produce which has satisfied the standards of organic 
certification, while they seldom choose to certify their product. However, farmers 
(implicitly) observing all organic requirements must obtain certification if they wish 
to sell their products as organic in relatively large, anonymous markets or in state 
supervised markets (Veldstra et al., 2014); otherwise, they may be considered as 
conventional products. Hazell et al. (2010) also point out that supermarkets have 
become dominant in the food market, but it is difficult for smallholders to meet the 
required standard of supermarkets. Therefore, it is critical for the food supplier to 
decide the certification strategy based on the trade-off between the benefits from 
certification (additional health utility from certification) and the cost of certification. 
Retailers often sell multiple brands of a single type of product (Krishna, 1992; 




shopping in large malls, supermarkets, and big-box stores offering a variety of brands 
for many products rather than in direct-sale stores of particular brands. A similar 
phenomenon can be found in the food industry, and the importance of brands in 
affecting food consumption has been widely examined (e.g., Anselmsson et al., 2014; 
Sjostrom et al., 2014). Thus, the retailer will decide whether to procure products from 
multiple suppliers or one of them. Furthermore, the retailer should also set the 
retailing price for products according to the certification strategy of food suppliers. 
Since food industry faces intense competition, how should the food suppliers make 
their certification strategy under competition? 
According to the research findings shown in the literature review, we find that 
competition may further weaken the benefits of certification (high certification cost is 
the basic barrier for small-scale producers). However, if one of competing suppliers 
chooses not to certify the product, his product is likely to be considered as 
conventional. What is worse, he will suffer the risk of quitting the market especially 
when the retailer may choose only one supplier. Thus, it is essential for suppliers to 
make certification strategy by taking the competition into consideration. We propose a 
modeling framework in which the retailer procures product from two suppliers: 
supplier 1 with a brand name and supplier 2 without a brand name. We consider two 
products competing on two attributes, one is brand value, the other is health utility 
which has been defined as the influence that customers believe consuming organic 
product has on their health (Howlett et al., 2009). 
This paper attempts to enhance the discussion on organic certification 
considering those whose actual organic practices already satisfy the certification 
standard. Past studies have indicated that organic food is perceived healthier than 
conventionally produced food for both environment and human (Michaelidou and 
Hassan, 2008). Health is among main factors inducing customers’ organic food 
purchase intention (Hsu et al., 2016). If one supplier chooses not to certify, the 
product will be considered as conventional and lose health utility, if the supplier 




confirming that the process of producing does not use pesticides, growth hormones or 
antibiotics, but the supplier must pay the certification cost. We incorporate a customer 
choice model to determine demand, we assume that customers value product 1 higher 
than product 2 in terms of brand, but that the difference between the valuations of the 
two types of products varies across individuals. In addition, we use health utility to 
capture the difference between the products with and without organic label. Due to the 
equivalence of organic standards, we assume that customers obtain the same health 
utility from organic label which is independent of the brand of the product. We find 
that supplier 2 with low brand recognition sometimes can improve the deficiency in 
brand by organic certification, and he is more eager to adopt certification strategy 
with higher risk of being quitted by the retailer. When the suppliers simultaneously 
certify the product, they may fall into the prisoner’s dilemma with higher certification 
cost and lower health utility from organic label.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study combines 
two utilities, namely, brand value and health utility, they both affect the customer’s 
surplus in purchasing the food, which further segments the market by means of the 
customer’s surplus in purchasing each product. Second, we clearly identify the 
conditions under which the suppliers should certificate the product. Third, we 
conclude the conditions when the retailer should procure the product from both brands 
or a single brand, and decide the corresponding pricing strategies of the retailer and 
the suppliers. Our research aims to address the following key questions: 
(1) Under what conditions will the suppliers certificate the product? Will organic 
certification always benefit the suppliers? 
(2) What is the optimal supplier selection strategy for the retailer? 
(3) What are the impacts of health utility from certification and customers’ brand 
recognition on the optimal pricing policies, profits of the retailer and the suppliers, 
and on the strategy of the certification considering certification cost? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 




customer demand is obtained according to the customers’ utility functions. Section 4 
studies two suppliers’ and the retailer’s pricing decisions under different certification 
scenarios, and provides Nash equilibrium certification strategy when competing 
suppliers simultaneously make decisions. Section 5 concludes our research findings 
and points out further extensions of this work. 
2. Literature review 
First, our work is closely related to studies of the organic certification strategy under 
competition. Clark et al. (2016) conclude that access to certification may not be 
effective if it is not accompanied by other measures and policies favorable to 
small-scale producers. Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) show that organic and 
organic-fairtrade farmers have become poorer relative to conventional producers. 
Some researchers consider that when labelling products from different countries use 
the same organic logo, it will reduce customers’ differentiation between organic 
products from different countries if customers are informed about the equivalence of 
organic standards (Janssen and Hamm, 2012b; Xie et al., 2016). However, researchers 
mainly study the certification strategy through empirical research, there are very 
limited studies that study the strategy of organic certification from the perspective of 
operations management.  
Our work is also related to the studies on pricing decisions based on quality 
under competition. Some researchers study the model with two competing retailers or 
manufacturers, Motta (1993) develops a pricing strategy based on quality and the 
customer taste in a Bertrand duopoly model. Karaer and Erhun (2015) analyze the role 
of quality as a competitive tool in a price and quality-based setting. Jing (2016) 
examines how behavior-based price discrimination affects the firms’ endogenous 
quality differentiation and profits. Ozinci et al. (2017) consider pricing decisions of 
agri-food retailers offering organic food and conventional food, where the two 
product versions differ from each other in terms of their shelf lives and their utility to 
customers. Zhou (2018) examines the role of green consumerism under competition 




green customers is beneficial to the green manufacturer and two groups of customers. 
Wu et al. (2018) study the sampling and pricing strategies for sellers of competing 
products in an oligopoly market, and they show that the intensity of product 
competition and customer switching behavior play important roles in determining 
equilibrium sampling strategy. Our research is similar to theirs, we extend the model 
to the two-stage supply chain, and study the retailer’s supplier selection strategy. They 
study the sampling and pricing strategies considering horizontal product 
differentiation by using a Hotelling model, while our model considers vertical product 
differentiation. 
Some researchers also study the pricing decisions based on quality under 
competition in a two-stage supply chain. Matsubayashi (2007) studies the problem 
that two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize 
their profits, and shows that differentiation always increases the firms’ profits, but 
also it can increase the customers’ welfare in a quality-sensitive market. Matsubayashi 
and Yamada (2008) further study the impact of asymmetric customer loyalty on two 
firms’ competition under a setting where the firms simultaneously determine their 
prices and quality levels. Wang et al. (2017) explore the interaction of channel 
structure with price and quality-based competition between two manufacturers who 
are asymmetric on customer loyalty. They divide the market into the price-sensitive 
market and quality-sensitive market, and find that the equilibrium depends on the 
market type. Luo et al. (2017) investigate a supply chain consisting of two 
manufacturers with a good brand and an average brand, and study the optimal pricing 
policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures.  
In terms of pricing decisions in a non-perishable agricultural supply chain, 
Assefa et al. (2014) develop a classic oligopoly model to assess the degree of price 
transmission in a two-stage farmer-retailer supply chain. Perlman et al. (2019) study 
the pricing decisions in a dual supply chain where organic and conventional suppliers 
simultaneously distribute their product directly to customers and via a single retailer 




supply chain, they mainly consider the deterioration of the product, and study the 
pricing decision and coordination (Blackburn and Scudder, 2009; Cai et al., 2010; Cai 
et al., 2013; Wang and Chen, 2017).  
However, most of the studies considering organic certification strategy are from 
the perspective of empirical study. A few above-mentioned studies (see e.g., Luo et al., 
2017) focus on supplier selection under competition. A few other studies (see e.g., Wu 
et al., 2018) have considered the decision of quality information revealing under 
competition. Here, we combine the problems of supplier selection and quality 
information disclosure, trying to solve the certification strategy under competition. 
Table 1 makes a summary of relevant literature. 







Competition Agricultural  
product 
Motta (1993)  √   √  
Matsubayashi (2007) √  √ √  
Matsubayashi and Yamada (2008) √  √ √  
Blackburn and Scudder (2009) √  √  √ 
Cai et al. (2010) √  √  √ 
Beuchelt and Zeller (2011)  √  √ √ 
Janssen and Hamm (2012b)  √  √ √ 
Cai et al. (2013) √  √  √ 
Assefa et al. (2014)  √  √ √ √ 
Karaer and Erhun (2015) √   √  
Clark et al. (2016)  √  √ √ 
Jing (2016) √   √  
Xie et al. (2016)  √  √ √ 
Luo et al. (2017) √  √ √  
Ozinci et al. (2017) √   √ √ 
Wang et al. (2017) √  √ √  
Wang and Chen (2017) √  √  √ 
Wu et al. (2018) √   √  
Zhou (2018) √   √  
Perlman et al. (2019) √  √ √ √ 
This paper √ √ √ √ √ 
3. Model setting 




which follows the organic practice, denoted by 𝑠𝑠1 and 𝑠𝑠2, to a retailer. The retailer is 
the leader who plays a dominant role in this supply chain. Retailers, such as Wal-Mart 
and Carrefour (Ertek& Griffin, 2002), may play a more dominant role than upstream 
members. Two suppliers have balanced power and make decisions simultaneously. 
Customers are heterogeneous in the valuation of the product, big Data opens a wide 
range of possibilities for organizations to understand the needs of their customers, 
predict their preference and shopping patterns, and optimize the use of resources 
(Assunção et al., 2015), which contributes to market segmentation by understanding 
customer behavior. We assume customers value the brand name of supplier 1 at 𝑣𝑣 
which is uniformly distributed on [0,1] (Chiang et al., 2003), and value the no-name 
product of supplier 2 at 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣, where 𝜃𝜃 means customer acceptance for the no-name 
product and 𝜃𝜃 ∈ (0,1)  (Luo et al., 2017), 𝜃𝜃  can also reflect the competition 
intensity, and a larger 𝜃𝜃 means a stronger competition intensity. For instance, the 
Chinese people view rice from Harbin higher than other rice, scientists have 
developed different brands that are tailored for each specific region based on the 
ecological environment in different regions of Harbin，especially，Wuchang in Harbin 
is famous for the brand Daohuaxiang (see 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/regional/Harbinrice.html). The brand competition 
intensity of rice in Harbin is high, however, that between Harbin and other cities in 
China is low. Since this paper considers two suppliers with different brands, thus, 
𝜃𝜃 ≠ 1. If 𝜃𝜃 = 1, two suppliers show no difference in terms of brand recognition, the 
certification equilibrium will be symmetric (Proof see Appendix A2). If the supplier 
spends cost 𝐹𝐹 certifying the product, he can obtain the organic label to confirm the 
product being organic; otherwise, the product will be considered as conventional. We 
assume customers are concerned about healthy eating, they will obtain additional 
utility from purchasing organic products which can be denoted as ∆ and ∆∈ (0,1]. 
The retailer sets the marginal profit for two products which can be denoted as 
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 = 1,2). Supplier’s wholesale price is 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛, and the selling price is 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 which 




suppliers simultaneously determine whether to certify the product or not. In stage 2, 
the retailer chooses to procure products from either both suppliers or one of them 
considering the suppliers’ certification decisions and anticipating the wholesale prices 
of two products, and determines the corresponding marginal profit per unit. In stage 3, 
given the marginal profit for the two products, the suppliers simultaneously decide the 
wholesale prices. In stage 4, the customers decide to purchase the product with a good 









Fig. 1. The sequence of events in the game. 
Let ζ𝑛𝑛 be the indicator function characterizing the certification decision, that is, 
ζ𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 = 1,2) = �
1, certification,
0, no certification. 
Let 𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 + ζ1∆ be the utility a customer derives from product 1, and 𝑢𝑢2 =
𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 + ζ2∆ is the utility a customer derives from product 2. The customer will 
choose to buy the product from supplier 1 only if 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 + ζ1∆≥ 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 + ζ2∆ and 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 + ζ1∆≥ 0. When 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 + ζ1∆< 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 + ζ2∆ and 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 + ζ2∆≥ 0, the 
customer will buy the product from supplier 2. Thus, the demand function can be 













≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆
0, 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆< 𝜃𝜃 < 1















≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆
1 − 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝜃𝜃
, 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆< 𝜃𝜃 < 1




Suppliers decide the 
certification strategy 
 
Retailer chooses supplier(s) and 







Let subscripts 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑟𝑟 represent the suppliers and the retailer, respectively. The 
suppliers’ profit functions are: 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1 = (𝑤𝑤1 − 𝑐𝑐1)𝐷𝐷1 − ζ1𝐹𝐹,                   (3) 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2 = (𝑤𝑤2 − 𝑐𝑐2)𝐷𝐷2 − ζ2𝐹𝐹.                   (4) 
The retailer’s profit function is:    
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = 𝑚𝑚1𝐷𝐷1 + 𝑚𝑚2𝐷𝐷2.                     (5) 
The market size of potential customers is normalized to 1 and the production 
costs of the suppliers are normalized to zero without loss of generality, we further 
study the model considering production costs in Appendix D. Each customer 
purchases at most 1 unit product.                         
4. Equilibrium certification strategy  
Backward induction is used to solve this leader–follower game. Since two suppliers 
are the followers in terms of pricing, first, the suppliers assume the retailer’s marginal 
profit is known and obtain their optimal response function to maximize the profit. 
Then, with the suppliers’ response function known, the retailer solves the profit 
maximization problem and optimizes the marginal profit. After solving the suppliers’ 
and the retailer’s pricing strategy under four different certification scenarios, we 
finally solve the suppliers’ certification strategy and the retailer’s supplier selection 
strategy. However, since the suppliers’ certification strategy which has a great effect 
on retailer’s decision prior to retailer’s supplier selection strategy, we will solve 
retailer’s supplier selection strategy firstly, then determine suppliers’ certification 
decisions by using backward induction. 
From the proof shown in Appendix A1, we obtain the basic solutions as follows. 
When 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
, the retailer only procures products from supplier 1, the 
marginal profit, wholesale price, selling price of product 1, and profits for supplier 1 
and the retailer are: 
                         𝑚𝑚1∗ =
1+ζ1∆
2








    𝑝𝑝1∗ =
3(1+ζ1∆)
4




− ζ1𝐹𝐹,                      (9) 
  𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟∗ =
(1+ζ1∆)2
8
.                          (10) 
When 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆ , the retailer procures both 
products from supplier 1 and supplier 2. The marginal profits, wholesale prices, 
selling prices of two products and profits for suppliers and the retailer are: 
      𝑚𝑚1∗ =
1+ζ1∆
2




(𝜃𝜃 + ζ2∆),                         (12) 
          𝑤𝑤1∗ =
2−2𝜃𝜃+(2−𝜃𝜃)ζ1∆−ζ2∆
2(4−𝜃𝜃)




















− ζ2𝐹𝐹,                (18) 
   𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟∗ =
𝜃𝜃(2−𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃2)+𝜃𝜃ζ1∆(4(1−𝜃𝜃)+(2−𝜃𝜃)ζ1∆)+2𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃−ζ1∆)ζ2∆+(2−𝜃𝜃)ζ22∆2
4(4−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
.      (19) 
When 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆< 𝜃𝜃 < 1, the retailer only procures products 
from supplier 2, the marginal profit, wholesale price, selling price of product 2, and 
























4.1. Equilibrium pricing decisions for given certification scenarios 
For the suppliers, there are four certification scenarios: (I) both suppliers implement 
the certification activity (certification-certification strategy), (II) certification-no 
certification strategy, (III) no certification-certification strategy, and (IV) neither of 
suppliers implements the certification activity (no certification-no certification 
strategy). 
Lemma 1. When the retailer simultaneously procures products from two suppliers, 
(i) In four certification scenarios, supplier 1’s wholesale price and profit always 
decrease in 𝜃𝜃; 
(ii) In four certification scenarios, when 𝛥𝛥 > 4−8𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃
2
4𝜁𝜁1+2𝜁𝜁2
, supplier 2’s wholesale price 
decreases in 𝜃𝜃; otherwise, it is unimodal in 𝜃𝜃, that is, supplier 2’s wholesale price 
increases in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝜃𝜃 < 4 − 2√3 and decreases in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝜃𝜃 > 4 − 2√3; 
(iii) In scenario I and scenario II, when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
7
, supplier 2’s profit decreases in 𝜃𝜃; 
otherwise, it increases in 𝜃𝜃  when 𝛥𝛥 < (1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(−4+7𝜃𝜃)
𝜃𝜃(−4+𝜃𝜃(−1+2𝜃𝜃))+(−8+𝜃𝜃(18+𝜃𝜃(−9+2𝜃𝜃)))𝜁𝜁2
 and 
decreases in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝛥𝛥 > (1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(−4+7𝜃𝜃)
𝜃𝜃(−4+𝜃𝜃(−1+2𝜃𝜃))+(−8+𝜃𝜃(18+𝜃𝜃(−9+2𝜃𝜃)))𝜁𝜁2
; 
(iv) In scenario III, when 4
7
< 𝜃𝜃 < 9−√17
8
, supplier 2’s profit decreases in θ; when 
𝜃𝜃 > 9−√17
8
, supplier 2’s profit firstly decreases in θ if 𝛥𝛥 < (1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(−4+7𝜃𝜃)
−8+𝜃𝜃(18+𝜃𝜃(−9+2𝜃𝜃))
 and 
then increases in θ; when 𝜃𝜃 < 4
7
, supplier 2’s profit firstly increases in θ if 𝛥𝛥 <
(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(−4+7𝜃𝜃)
−8+𝜃𝜃(18+𝜃𝜃(−9+2𝜃𝜃))
 and then decreases in θ. In scenario IV, it increases in 𝜃𝜃 when 
𝜃𝜃 < 4
7
 and decreases in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
7
. 
One may intuitively think that supplier 2’s wholesale price will always increase in 
𝜃𝜃. Lemma 1(ii) shows that this intuition is correct when both the health utility brought 
by organic certification and supplier 2’s brand recognition are low. However, once one 
of the above two factors is high, this intuition may not be true. In scenario I, 𝐷𝐷1∗ − 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
𝛥𝛥(−2+𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃
2(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, keeping 𝛥𝛥 fixed, if 𝜃𝜃 > 2𝛥𝛥
1+𝛥𝛥




product 2. Supplier 2 will lower the wholesale price to motivate the retailer to procure 
product 2, which makes supplier 2’s profit decrease in 𝜃𝜃  when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
7
. However, 
supplier 2 can still reduce the profit gap between two products with the increase of 𝜃𝜃 
since supplier 1’s profit also decreases in 𝜃𝜃. Supplier 2 can lower the selling price gap 
between two products by certification (i.e., ∂𝑝𝑝1
∗−𝑝𝑝2∗
∂𝛥𝛥
< 0). The selling price of product 2 
always increases in 𝜃𝜃 and ∆, since low health utility leads to product 2’s low selling 
price, the decline in demand caused by the rise in selling price due to the increase of 𝜃𝜃 
is weak. However, higher health utility leads to higher decline in demand. Supplier 2 
will lower the wholesale price to boost demand with an increase of 𝜃𝜃. 
In scenario II, the wholesale price and profit of product 2 will increase in 𝜃𝜃 when 




𝜃𝜃 , we find that 
when ∆ is high, supplier 1’s certification behavior will heavily weaken supplier 2’s 
demand, such inferiority increases as 𝜃𝜃 increases (i.e., ∂
2𝐷𝐷2
∂∆∂𝜃𝜃
< 0), thus, supplier 2 
will reduce the wholesale price when 𝜃𝜃 is high, which also hurts his profit.  
In scenario III, we find that when only supplier 2 certificates the product, supplier 
2’s profit increases in θ only if health utility and brand recognition are both low or high. 
When health utility is low, supplier 2 has to reduce his wholesale price with a high 





> 0 and 
∂2𝑝𝑝2∗
∂∆∂𝜃𝜃
< 0, which means that when 𝜃𝜃 is high, the increase of selling price due to higher 
health utility is weak, thus, supplier 2 can still raise his wholesale price. However, 
accompanied by supplier 2’s low brand recognition and high health utility, the 
increase of selling price due to higher health utility is rapid, which will reduce the 
customer demand for product 2, supplier 2 will lower wholesale price to boost demand. 
Therefore, supplier 2’s profit will decrease in 𝜃𝜃 with a low brand recognition and high 
health utility. 
In scenario IV, the retailer will always set a margin profit increasing in supplier 2’s 




price as 𝜃𝜃 increases, which is beneficial for his profit. However, the corresponding 
selling price will be gradually higher with the increase of 𝜃𝜃. When 𝜃𝜃 is high, the 
margin profit for product 2 still keeps increasing, supplier 2 has to reduce his wholesale 
price to avoid demand loss brought by a rapidly-growing selling price. Thus, the profit 
of supplier 2 will decrease in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
7
. 
Define the profit of entire supply chain as 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2 , and the 










�, then, we have the following findings. 
Proposition 1. When two suppliers simultaneously certify the product: 
(i) If 𝜃𝜃 > 2
13
(3√3 − 1), the retailer’s profit increases in 𝜃𝜃; otherwise, it increases in 
𝜃𝜃 if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟∗  and decreases in 𝜃𝜃 if 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟∗ ; 
(ii) The profit of the supply chain increases in 𝜃𝜃 if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗  and decreases in 𝜃𝜃 if 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ ; 
(iii) If 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ , the customer surplus increases in 𝜃𝜃; otherwise, it increases in 𝜃𝜃 if 











We learn from Proposition 1(i) and Proposition 1(iii) that both the retailer and 
customers can benefit from supplier 2’s high brand recognition. If two suppliers 
simultaneously certify the product, they show no differences in terms of health utility. 
When 𝜃𝜃 is high, two suppliers compete head-to-head, none of them can charge a 
high price, which attracts more customers. Therefore, the retailer will benefit from 
higher demand, and the customer surplus will be improved. However, if customers 
obtain relatively high health utility from the organic label, two suppliers can still set a 




always increase in 𝜃𝜃, the retailer’s profit and the customer surplus will decrease in 𝜃𝜃 
with low competition intensity and high health utility from organic label.  
Proposition 2. When two suppliers simultaneously certify the product, the profit gap 
between two suppliers decreases in ∆, compared with the scenario that they both do 
not certify the product, the increase of profit decreases in 𝜃𝜃. 
When two suppliers simultaneously certify the product, if we do not optimize the 








, the health utility brought 
from certification will be offset in the demand function of product 1, while supplier 2 
















< 0 , especially, 
the demand of product 2 even exceeds that of product 1 when 𝛥𝛥 > 𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃
. Thus, the 
profit gap between two suppliers decreases in ∆ due to the gap of both the demand 
and the wholesale price between two suppliers decreasing in ∆. Keeping ∆ fixed, 
competition intensity between two suppliers will be stronger as 𝜃𝜃 increases, which 
makes the increase of profit brought by certification decrease in 𝜃𝜃, that is, stronger 
competition intensity will weaken the benefits from organic certification. 
4.2. Supplier selection strategy for the retailer  
Proposition 3. When two suppliers adopt asymmetric certification strategies, the 
retailer tends to procure the product with organic label, especially when the health 
utility brought by organic certification becomes higher. 
If we do not consider the production cost, we confirm that when two suppliers 
take symmetric strategies, the retailer will simultaneously procure products from two 
suppliers. When two suppliers take certification-no certification strategy, the retailer 
will procure two products simultaneously if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃; otherwise, he will only 
procure products from supplier 1. When two suppliers take no 
certification-certification strategy, the retailer will procure two products 




2. When the suppliers take asymmetric certification strategy, with a higher health 
utility brought from organic label, the wholesale price and supplier’s profit of the one 
with certification increase, the selling price and profit of the retailer also increase, 
thus, the retailer is willing to procure the product with organic label. The wholesale 
price, selling price and supplier’s profit of the one without certification decrease, and 
can even be quitted by the retailer. 
4.3. Equilibrium certification strategy for the suppliers 
According to the suppliers’ pay-offs obtained from different certification scenarios 
and the retailer’s supplier selection strategy, we then examine two suppliers’ 
equilibrium certification strategy. When 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃, the retailer will simultaneously 
procure products from two suppliers regardless of suppliers’ certification behavior. 
We have the final certification strategy as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The organic certification strategy when 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃. 




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11  (1)  
𝛥𝛥11 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12  (2)  
𝛥𝛥12 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥13  (3)  
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥13  (4)  
7−√41
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
  
𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11  (1)  
𝛥𝛥11 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12  (2)  




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11  (1)  
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥11  (2)  
The equilibrium certification strategy can be seen in Appendix C. 
From Table 2, we find that in each case, two suppliers adopt 
certification-certification strategy when 𝐹𝐹  is very low, and finally adopt no 
certification-no certification strategy when 𝐹𝐹 is very high. However, when 𝐹𝐹 is 
moderate, the certification strategy varies with the change of 𝛥𝛥 and 𝜃𝜃. When the 
health utility brought from organic label is low (𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11), if 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, supplier 
2 will decide whether to certify the product or not based on supplier 1’s behavior and 




from certificating the product. However, we have shown that low health utility will be 
more beneficial for supplier 1 in Proposition 2, thus, certification is supplier 1’s 
dominant strategy, which makes supplier 2 adopt contrary strategy- no certification. 
When health utility brought from organic label is high and 𝜃𝜃 is low (𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥12 ∩
𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
), if 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11 or 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, since supplier 2’s brand recognition 
is low, supplier 1 has no incentive to certificate the product. Furthermore, we have 
confirmed that if two suppliers certificate the product simultaneously, the profit gap 
between two suppliers will decrease with the increase of 𝛥𝛥. Therefore, when 𝛥𝛥 is 
high and 𝜃𝜃 is low, supplier 1 has no incentive to certificate the product, he will adopt 
the strategy contrary to supplier 2. However, supplier 2 can alleviate his deficiency in 
brand recognition by certification if 𝛥𝛥 is high, thus, certification is supplier 2’s 
dominant strategy, which makes supplier 1 adopt contrary strategy-no certification. 
However, Case (3) and Case (4) also differ with the increase of certification cost. 
When 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥13 and in the region of 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, both suppliers have dominant 
strategy in Case (4). For supplier 1, there is no need to certificate the product due to 
high health utility and supplier 2’s low brand recognition, furthermore, the 
certification cost here is higher compared with the region of 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, therefore, 
no certification will be supplier 1’s dominant strategy. For supplier 2, since higher 
health utility will make up for the deficiency of low brand recognition, certification is 
still his dominant strategy if 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, while certification will no longer be 
dominant with the increase of certification cost in the region of 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12. In 
Case (3), when 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, none of the two suppliers have dominant strategy. 
When 𝜃𝜃 is high (𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2
), supplier 1 will realize the competitive threat from 
supplier 2, since supplier 1’s brand recognition is higher than that of supplier 2, 
supplier 1 has more economic power in certificating the product. If 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12 in 
Case (1) or 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13 in Case (2), certification is supplier 1’s dominant strategy. 
However, Case (1) and Case (2) also differ with the increase of certification cost. In 
Case (2), when 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥11 and in the region of 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, since supplier 2’s 




suppliers have no dominant strategy. For supplier 1, higher health utility from organic 
label is not too beneficial, although supplier 2 has a relatively high brand recognition, 
the certification cost is higher compared with the region 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, thus, the 
certification strategy is no longer supplier 1’s dominant strategy. For supplier 2, since 
higher health utility will be more beneficial for him, no certification is not his 
dominant strategy either. In Case (1), when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11 and in the region of 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤
𝐹𝐹�13, both of two suppliers have dominant strategy. For supplier 1, facing supplier 2’s 
high brand recognition and low health utility, certification is still supplier 1’s 
dominant strategy. For supplier 2, the certification cost is higher compared with the 
region 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, and health utility is low here, thus, no certification is supplier 




















































Fig. 2. The certification strategy regarding ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 when 𝜃𝜃 = 0.3 ∩ 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃. 
Fig. 2 reflects the certification strategy regarding ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 when 𝜃𝜃 = 0.3 ∩
𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃. Keeping ∆ fixed, each figure in Fig.2 can be divided into different parts 
with the increase of 𝐹𝐹. Both suppliers adopt certification strategy when 𝐹𝐹 is low, 
and they both adopt no certification strategy when 𝐹𝐹 is high. The shaded parts in Fig. 
2(a) and Fig. 2(b) shift from 1-0 to 0-1 in Fig. 2(c) (shaded area) due to the fact that 
supplier 2’s brand recognition here is low, he will benefit more from certification with 
the increase of ∆. 
In Fig. 3, we assume ∆= 0.3  and 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 , when supplier 2’s brand 
recognition is low (𝜃𝜃 ≤ 0.26), two suppliers will reach 0-1 equilibrium with a 
moderate 𝐹𝐹 (shaded area in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b)). With the increase of 𝜃𝜃, the 
equilibrium will transform from 0-1 to 1-0 (shaded area in Fig. 3(c)).  
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Fig. 3. The certification strategy regarding 𝜃𝜃 and 𝐹𝐹 when ∆= 0.3 ∩ 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃. 
When 1 − 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ min {2 − 2𝜃𝜃, 1}, the retailer will only procure products 1 in 
the certification-no certification scenario. We have the final certification strategy as 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. The organic certification strategy when 1 − 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ min {2 − 2𝜃𝜃, 1}. 
𝜃𝜃  𝛥𝛥 Case 
𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃23   (5) 
𝜃𝜃23 < 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃24  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥23  (6) 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥23  (5)  
𝜃𝜃24 < 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃21   (6)  




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥21 (7) 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥21 (6)  
5−√17
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃22  
𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥22 (8) 
𝛥𝛥22 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥21  (7)  
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥21 (6)  




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥22 (8) 





The equilibrium certification strategy can be seen in Appendix C. 
From the equilibrium certification strategy of Table 3 in Appendix C, we find 
that if one of two suppliers has dominant strategy, two suppliers reach 0-1 equilibrium 
with moderate certification cost except for the Case (8). Actually, when 5−√17
2
< 𝜃𝜃 <























 in Table 3, compared with the region of 𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2
 in Table 2, we find supplier 
1 is eager to certificate the product only when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥22 rather than always adopting 
certification strategy in the region of 𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2





∩ 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥22, low health utility brings supplier 2 few benefits, while supplier 
1 comes to realize the competition threaten from supplier 2 due to supplier 2’s high 
brand recognition. Thus, the enthusiasm of certification for supplier 1 is stronger than 
that of supplier 2, and supplier 1 always adopts certification strategy regardless of the 
choice of supplier 2, supplier 2 has to take the contrary strategy- no certification due 
to the fact that if he also certificates the product, he can only obtain negative profit. 
Finally, supplier 2 will be quitted by the retailer, and his profit is zero.  
Comparing Case (6) and Case (7), we find that the main difference generates in 
the fourth part, namely, when 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12 in Case (6) and when 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22 
in Case (7). When 𝛥𝛥 is high (𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥21) and 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12 , no certification is 
supplier 1’s dominant strategy since higher health utility is not too beneficial for 
supplier 1 under competition. When 𝛥𝛥 is low (𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥21) and 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, no 
certification is no longer supplier 1’s dominant strategy, however, certification also 
cannot be supplier 1’s dominant strategy due to high certification cost. Facing high 
certification cost and low health utility, no certification will be supplier 2’s dominant 
strategy, thus, supplier 1 will adopt asymmetric certification strategy based on 
supplier 2’s decision. 
In this section, supplier 2 will face the risk of being quitted by the retailer if he 
does not certify the product. Therefore, we find that supplier 2 in this region is eager 
to certificate the product (see 0-1 in Fig. 4). When the health utility is relatively low in 
Fig. 4(a), there exists one certification equilibrium without dominant strategy (shaded 






Fig. 4. The certification strategy regarding ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 when 𝜃𝜃 = 0.3 ∩ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤
min {2 − 2𝜃𝜃, 1}. 
When 2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1  and 𝜃𝜃 > 1
2
, if two suppliers take asymmetric 
certification strategies, the retailer will only procure products with organic label. We 
have the final certification strategy as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. The organic certification strategy when 2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1. 
𝜃𝜃 𝛥𝛥 Case 
1
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 9−√17
8
  
 (9)  
9−√17
8
< 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1  
2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < ∆< √𝜃𝜃  (10)  
∆> √𝜃𝜃  (9)  
The equilibrium certification strategy can be seen in Appendix C. 
In this region, when 𝐹𝐹 is moderate (see Cases (9) and (10) in Appendix C), 
facing supplier 2’s high brand recognition and low health utility, two suppliers will 
reach 1-0 equilibrium, otherwise, they will reach 0-1 equilibrium. In Fig. 5, we 
assume ∆= 1 and 2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1, both supplier 2’s brand recognition and health 
utility from organic label are high here. We find that supplier 2 may still adopt 
certification strategy with a high brand recognition (shaded area in Fig. 5, where dark 
shadow and light shadow represent the equilibrium with and without dominant 
strategy, respectively). 






























Fig. 5. The certification strategy regarding 𝜃𝜃 and 𝐹𝐹 when ∆= 1 ∩ 2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1. 
Proposition 4. When two suppliers both adopt certification strategy, they will fall into 
the prisoner’s dilemma if the health utility from organic label is low and the 
certification cost is high. 
When 𝐹𝐹 > max �𝛥𝛥(4+𝛥𝛥)(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2
, 𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 �  in the certification-certification 
strategy, two suppliers will fall into the prisoner’s dilemma. From the proof in 
Appendix B, we find that two suppliers will fall in the prisoner’s dilemma in the 
following conditions: if 𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹
�13  and 𝛥𝛥 <
4(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
4−(4−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
 in Cases 
(3)~(7); if 𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹
�11 in Cases (1) and (2); if 
𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)
(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
< 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹�21 in 
Cases (8) and (10); if 𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹
�33 and 𝛥𝛥 < 2�
𝜃𝜃
4−𝜃𝜃
 in Case (9). When the 
certification cost is very small, certification will still benefit both suppliers, which 
means that the prisoner’s dilemma is common when the certification cost is relatively 
expensive. The findings of the prisoner’s dilemma in organic certification are similar 
to Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) which shows that organic and organic-fairtrade farmers 
have become poorer relative to conventional producers.  
Proposition 5. 
(i) When 𝐹𝐹 is very low, two suppliers will both adopt certification strategy; when 𝐹𝐹 
is very high, two suppliers will both adopt no certification strategy.  
(ii) When 𝐹𝐹 is moderate, the supplier with low brand recognition will be more eager 

















to obtain the organic label with higher risk of being quitted by the retailer.  
Each case can be divided into 5 parts with the increase of 𝐹𝐹, which shows that 
two suppliers will reach 1-1 equilibrium in the first part, and reach 0-0 equilibrium in 
the fifth part (see Appendix C). In other parts (i.e., the certification cost is moderate), 
the certification strategies are different in Tables 2-4: in Table 2, we find that two 
suppliers will reach 0-1 equilibrium in Cases (3) and (4) which show supplier 2’s low 
brand recognition and high health utility. In Table 3, two suppliers will reach 0-1 
equilibrium in Cases (5)-(7). We find that supplier 2 will also certify the product in 
the condition with low health utility and brand recognition. In Table 4, two suppliers 
will reach 0-1 equilibrium in Case (9). We find that supplier 2 will certify the product 
even in the condition with high health utility and brand recognition (e.g.,9−√17
8
< 𝜃𝜃 ≤
1 and ∆> √θ in Case (9)). The retailer will procure from two suppliers regardless of 
their organic label in Table 2, and he will only procure from supplier 1 if two 
suppliers adopt certification-no certification (1-0) strategy in Table 3, he will procure 
from the supplier with organic label if two suppliers adopt asymmetric certification 
strategy in Table 4. In other words, the competition intensity is gradually increasing in 
three tables. Comparing three tables, we can obtain Proposition 5(ii). 
Proposition 6. When the retailer procures from two suppliers simultaneously 
regardless of the organic label, supplier 2 can obtain more profits than supplier 1 by 
organic certification with relatively low competition intensity and high health utility 
from organic label. 
From the proof in the Appendix B, we find that when two suppliers both certify 
the product in Table 2, supplier 2 may obtain more profits than the rival by organic 
certification if 𝜃𝜃 < 7−√41
2
 in Cases (3) and (4), and if 7−√41
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
 in Case (3). 
When two suppliers adopt no certification-certification strategy in Table 2, supplier 2 
may obtain more profits than the rival by organic certification if 𝜃𝜃 < 7−√41
2
 in Cases 
(3) and (4), 7−√41
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
 in Cases (2) and (3) and if 5−√17
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃31(𝜃𝜃31 ≈
0.484) in Case (2). These conditions include low competition intensity and high 




above conditions.  
5. Conclusion 
Food safety has always been drawing attention from general public and government 
agencies. With the development of information technology and big data, customers 
now can obtain food safety information more easily than before. Certification as one 
way of information disclosure has been widely investigated in the field of empirical 
research. However, no researchers have studied the organic certification strategy 
under competition in the field of operations management. In this paper, we separate 
the production and certification strategy of organic food, and analyze the organic 
certification strategy of two suppliers with different brands whose product already 
satisfies the standard of organic certification. Suppliers have to pay certification cost 
to prove the product to be organic by getting an organic label, otherwise, their product 
will be considered as conventional which has no additional health utility. Customers 
are heterogeneous in their perception of brand valuation, while the health utility from 
organic label is the same due to the equivalence of organic standards. We identify the 
conditions under which the retailer should procure two products simultaneously or 
only one product, and also analyze the condition under which the suppliers should 
certify the product. We find that the supplier with low brand recognition can improve 
the deficiency in brand by organic certification. When the certification cost is 
moderate, the supplier with low brand recognition will be more eager than the rival to 
obtain the organic label with higher risk of being quitted by the retailer. Certification 
may not always benefit suppliers, when two suppliers adopt certification strategy 
simultaneously, they may fall into the prisoner’s dilemma with relatively high 
certification cost and low health utility from organic label. 
In future research, we will further investigate the certification strategy for the 
supplier whose product does not satisfy the organic standard. Thus, the supplier has to 
invest effort such as using organic fertilizers to meet the requirements of organic 
certification. Therefore, the decision of whether to produce the organic product or not 




investigate the influence of suppliers’ corporate social responsibility on the decisions 
of production and certification. Furthermore, the customers may be heterogeneous on 
the health utility from organic label. 
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Appendix A1. The equilibrium prices for a given certification 
strategy. 
We consider the situation of the retailer procuring two products, i.e., 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤
𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆. 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑤𝑤1 �1 −
𝑤𝑤1+𝑚𝑚1−(𝑤𝑤2+𝑚𝑚2)+(ζ2−ζ1)∆
1−𝜃𝜃
� − ζ1𝐹𝐹, 


















. Substituting 𝑤𝑤1 and 𝑤𝑤2 into (5), we get: 
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = 𝑚𝑚1 �
2−2𝜃𝜃−(2−𝜃𝜃)𝑚𝑚1+𝑚𝑚2+(2−𝜃𝜃)ζ1∆−ζ2∆
(4−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)








= 0, we obtain 𝑚𝑚2∗ =
1
2
(𝜃𝜃 + ζ2∆), 𝑚𝑚1∗ =
1
2
(1 + ζ1∆). Replacing 𝑚𝑚2 







. We further get equations (15)~(19). 
Appendix A2. Certification strategy if 𝜽𝜽 = 𝟏𝟏. 
If 𝜃𝜃 = 1, the utility a customer derives from product 𝑛𝑛 can be denoted as 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 =
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 + ζ𝑛𝑛∆, the equilibrium price will satisfy 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑝𝑝1 = (ζ2 − ζ1)∆. If not, the 
demand of one supplier will be zero, so this supplier will adjust his wholesale price to 




overall demand will be 𝐷𝐷 = 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 + ζ𝑛𝑛∆, and the final demand for supplier 𝑛𝑛 will 
be split equally, which can be denoted as 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 =
1−𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛+ζ𝑛𝑛∆
2
. By maximizing 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 =
(1−(𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)+ζ𝑛𝑛∆
2
)𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 , we get 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛∗ =
1
2
(1 −𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + 𝛥𝛥𝜁𝜁𝑛𝑛) . Substituting 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛∗  into 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 =
∑ (1−(𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)+ζ𝑛𝑛∆
2
)𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛=1  and making 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟
∂𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
= 0 , we get 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛∗ =
1
2
(1 + 𝛥𝛥ζ𝑛𝑛) . 
Substituting 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛∗  into 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛∗ , we get 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛∗ =
1
4
(1 + 𝛥𝛥𝜁𝜁𝑛𝑛)  and 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛∗ =
3
4
(1 + 𝛥𝛥𝜁𝜁𝑛𝑛) . By 
substituting 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛∗  into the constraint of 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑝𝑝1 = (ζ2 − ζ1)∆, we get 𝜁𝜁1 = 𝜁𝜁2. The 
suppliers will certify the product if 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(ζ𝑛𝑛 = 1) − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛(ζ𝑛𝑛 = 0) > 0 , i.e., 𝐹𝐹 <
1
32
𝛥𝛥(2 + 𝛥𝛥). 
Appendix B. 
























thus, we find that when 𝜃𝜃 > 4 − 2√3, ∂𝑤𝑤2
∗
∂𝜃𝜃










(iii) In scenario I, ζ1 = ζ2 = 1, after substituting 𝑝𝑝1∗  and 𝑝𝑝2∗  into the constraint 
𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆, we get that the retailer will procure two 
products simultaneously. In scenario II, ζ1 = 1,ζ2 = 0, after substituting 𝑝𝑝1∗ and 𝑝𝑝2∗ 
into the constraint 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆, we get that the retailer 
will procure two products simultaneously if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃; otherwise, he will only 










𝑓𝑓1(𝛥𝛥) = 4𝜃𝜃 − 11𝜃𝜃2 + 7𝜃𝜃3 + 𝛥𝛥(18𝜃𝜃𝜁𝜁2 + 2𝜃𝜃3𝜁𝜁2 + 2𝜃𝜃3 − 4𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃2 − 9𝜃𝜃2𝜁𝜁2 − 8𝜁𝜁2). 
Since ∂𝑓𝑓1(𝛥𝛥)
∂𝛥𝛥




obtained at 𝛥𝛥 = 0. The minimum of 𝑓𝑓1(𝛥𝛥) which equals (−1 + 𝜃𝜃)(8 + 𝜃𝜃(−10 +
11𝜃𝜃)) in scenario I and −2(4 − 𝜃𝜃)(1− 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃2 in scenario II is obtained at 𝛥𝛥 = 1 
and 𝛥𝛥 = 1 − 𝜃𝜃 respectively. We find that the minimum of 𝑓𝑓1(𝛥𝛥) in scenario I and II 
is less than 0. Thus, when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
7
, 𝑓𝑓1(𝛥𝛥 = 0) < 0,
∂𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗
∂𝜃𝜃
< 0, when 𝜃𝜃 < 4
7










In scenario I, 𝑝𝑝1∗ − 𝑝𝑝2∗ =
(1−𝜃𝜃)(6−𝛥𝛥−2𝜃𝜃)
2(4−𝜃𝜃)

















> 0, 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃
8𝜃𝜃−2𝜃𝜃2






> 0, else, 
∂𝐷𝐷2∗
∂𝜃𝜃
< 0 . 𝐷𝐷1∗ − 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
𝛥𝛥(−2+𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃
2(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, if 𝜃𝜃 > 2𝛥𝛥
1+𝛥𝛥









� > 0. 
(iv) In scenario III, ζ1 = 0, ζ2 = 1, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ =
(𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)+(2−𝜃𝜃)𝛥𝛥)2
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
− 𝜁𝜁2𝐹𝐹. After substituting 
𝑝𝑝1∗ and 𝑝𝑝2∗ into the constraint 
𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 + (ζ1 − ζ2)∆, we get that 
the retailer will procure two products simultaneously if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 2 − 2𝜃𝜃; otherwise, he 





, 𝑓𝑓2(𝛥𝛥) = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(4 − 7𝜃𝜃) + 𝛥𝛥(−8 + 𝜃𝜃(18 +
𝜃𝜃(−9 + 2𝜃𝜃))) , 𝑓𝑓2(𝛥𝛥 = 0) = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(4 − 7𝜃𝜃) , if 𝜃𝜃 >
4
7
, 𝑓𝑓2(𝛥𝛥 = 0) < 0 , else, 













> 0 , else, ∂𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2
∗
∂𝜃𝜃
< 0 ; when 4
7





< 0 ; 
when 𝜃𝜃 > 9−√17
8





























, 𝑓𝑓3(𝛥𝛥) = 𝛥𝛥2(8𝜃𝜃 − 16 + 2𝜃𝜃2) + 12𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃2 + 12𝜃𝜃2 , 𝑓𝑓3(𝛥𝛥 = 1) =
−16 + 8𝜃𝜃 + 26𝜃𝜃2 , if 𝜃𝜃 > 2
13
(3√3 − 1) , 𝑓𝑓3(𝛥𝛥 = 1) > 0 , thus, 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟∗
∂𝜃𝜃






(3√3 − 1) , 𝑓𝑓3(𝛥𝛥 = 1) < 0 , if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟∗ , 𝑓𝑓3(𝛥𝛥) > 0 , thus, 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟∗
∂𝜃𝜃









, 𝑓𝑓4(𝛥𝛥) = 2𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃2(4 − 7𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃2(20 − 17𝜃𝜃) + 2𝛥𝛥2(𝜃𝜃(18 − 𝜃𝜃(5 +
𝜃𝜃)) − 24), 𝑓𝑓4(𝛥𝛥 = 1) = −48 + 3𝜃𝜃(12 + (6 − 11𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃) < 0,  

















, 𝑓𝑓5(𝛥𝛥) = 2𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃2(20 + 𝜃𝜃) +
2𝛥𝛥2(2 + 𝜃𝜃)(−4 + 5𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃2(28 + 5𝜃𝜃), 𝑓𝑓5(𝛥𝛥 = 1) = −16 + 𝜃𝜃(12 + 𝜃𝜃(78 + 7𝜃𝜃)), 
when 𝜃𝜃 > 4
5
, 𝑓𝑓5(𝛥𝛥) > 0, when 𝜃𝜃 <
4
5
, we let −16 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ �12 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ (78 + 7𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ )� = 0, 
if 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ , 𝑓𝑓5(𝛥𝛥 = 1) < 0, if 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ , 𝑓𝑓5(𝛥𝛥 = 1) > 0. Thus, we get if 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ , 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
> 0; otherwise, it increases in 𝜃𝜃 when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗  and decreases in 𝜃𝜃 when 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Since 𝐷𝐷1∗ − 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
𝜃𝜃−𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)
2(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, we get if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃
, 𝐷𝐷1∗ > 𝐷𝐷2∗, if 𝛥𝛥 >
𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃
























> 0, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ =
�𝛥𝛥2−𝜃𝜃�(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(−4+𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃


















Compared with the scenario that they both do not certify the product, the 
increase of supplier 1’s profit can be denoted by 𝜋𝜋∆𝑠𝑠1∗ = 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ (𝛿𝛿1 = 𝛿𝛿2 = 1) −
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ (𝛿𝛿1 = 𝛿𝛿2 = 0) =
𝛥𝛥(4+𝛥𝛥)(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2
, the increase of supplier 2’s profit can be denoted by 
















Proof of Proposition 3 
When 𝛿𝛿1 = 𝛿𝛿2 = 1 or 𝛿𝛿1 = 𝛿𝛿2 = 0, we find that 𝑝𝑝1∗  and 𝑝𝑝2∗  always satisfy 
𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆




satisfy the above constraint if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃; when 𝛿𝛿1 = 0, 𝛿𝛿2 = 1, 𝑝𝑝1∗ and 𝑝𝑝2∗ will 
satisfy the above constraint if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 2 − 2𝜃𝜃. 


























> 0 , ∂𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2
∗
∂𝛥𝛥
















































































Proof of Proposition 4 
We first consider the condition that 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃, the retailer will procure the 
products from two suppliers regardless of their organic label. To simplify the 
exposition, we use 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗  to represent supplier 2’s profit in the 
certification-certification scenario, similar symbols can be used to represent two 
suppliers’ profit in different certification scenarios. 
For supplier 2, given that supplier 1 adopts certification, supplier 2 adopts 
certification if 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗ > 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛∗ , otherwise no certification; given that supplier 1 adopts 
no certification, supplier 2 adopts certification if 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦∗ > 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ , otherwise no 
certification. For supplier 1, given that supplier 2 adopts certification, supplier 1 
adopts certification if 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗ > 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦∗ , otherwise no certification; given that supplier 2 
adopts no certification, supplier 1 adopts certification if 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛∗ > 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ , otherwise no 
certification. 
By equating 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗  and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛∗ , we get the threshold certification cost 𝐹𝐹�11 =
𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃+𝛥𝛥(2−3𝜃𝜃))
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃



















, we get if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11 = −2 +
4
2+(−1+𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�13 , 





,we get when 𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2
≈ 0.438 , 
𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�13, when 𝜃𝜃 <
5−√17
2
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12 =
2𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃






, we get when 𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2
, 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�14, when 𝜃𝜃 <
5−√17
2
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12 =
2𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃






, we get when 𝜃𝜃 > 7−√41
2




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥13 =
2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
2−(5−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�14 , else if 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥13 , 𝐹𝐹�11 > 𝐹𝐹�14 . In conclusion, we 
obtain the following results: 
In the region of 𝜃𝜃 < 7−√41
2
: when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11，we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14; 
when 𝛥𝛥11 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12, we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�14; when 𝛥𝛥12 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥13, we get 
𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�12; when 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥13, we get 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12. 
In the region of 7−√41
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
: when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11, we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹�14; when 𝛥𝛥11 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥12, we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�14; when 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥12, we get 
𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�12. 
In the region of 𝜃𝜃 > 5−√17
2
: when 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥11 , we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14 , 
when 𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥11, we get 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�14.  
In conclusion, we obtain the results in Table 2. 
For supplier 1, the benefit from certification can be denoted as 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ (ζ1 = ζ2 =
1) − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ (ζ1 = ζ2 = 0) = 𝐹𝐹1(𝛥𝛥) ≜
𝛥𝛥(4+𝛥𝛥)(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2
− 𝐹𝐹. For supplier 2, the benefit from 
certification can be denoted as 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ (ζ1 = ζ2 = 1) − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ (ζ1 = ζ2 = 0) = 𝐹𝐹2(𝛥𝛥) ≜
𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)
(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
− 𝐹𝐹. When𝐹𝐹 > max �𝛥𝛥(4+𝛥𝛥)(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2
, 𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 � =
𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)
(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
 in the 1-1 










, if 𝛥𝛥 < 4(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
4−(4−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, we get two suppliers will fall in 
the prisoner’s dilemma if they reach 1-1 equilibrium in Cases (3) ~ (7). Since 𝐹𝐹�21 −
𝐹𝐹2(𝛥𝛥) − 𝐹𝐹 =
(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
4(−4+𝜃𝜃)2
> 0, we get two suppliers will fall in the prisoner’s dilemma if 
they reach 1-1 equilibrium in Cases (8) and (10). In Cases (1) and (2), two suppliers 
will both certify the product when 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹�11 . Since  𝐹𝐹�11 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝛥𝛥) − 𝐹𝐹 =
𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃(2−𝛥𝛥−2𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)
> 0, we get two suppliers will fall in the prisoner’s dilemma if they reach 
1-1 equilibrium in Cases (1) and (2). In Case (9), two suppliers will both certify the 
product when 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹�33. Since 𝐹𝐹�33 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝛥𝛥) − 𝐹𝐹 =
(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥2(−4+𝜃𝜃)+4𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 2� 𝜃𝜃
4−𝜃𝜃
, 
we get two suppliers will fall in the prisoner’s dilemma if they reach 1-1 equilibrium 
in Case (9). 
Proof of Proposition 5 
We then consider the condition that 1 − 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ min {2 − 2𝜃𝜃, 1}, the retailer 
will only procure the products from supplier 1 in the certification - no certification 




; by equating 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦∗  and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ , we get 𝐹𝐹�12 =
𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)+2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)
4(−4+𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃








When 1 − 𝜃𝜃 < 𝛥𝛥 ≤ min {2 − 2𝜃𝜃, 1}, we get that: 
𝐹𝐹�13 − 𝐹𝐹�22 =
−2𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃2−(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(8+𝜃𝜃)+𝛥𝛥2�−16+𝜃𝜃(16+(−5+𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)�
16(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)
< 0,  
𝐹𝐹�21 − 𝐹𝐹�12 =
𝛥𝛥2(4−3𝜃𝜃)+2𝛥𝛥(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃−(1−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(−1+𝜃𝜃)









= 4𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)+2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)(1+𝛥𝛥)2(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃−16𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)2 , we let 𝐹𝐹11(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥) = 4𝛥𝛥(2 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥(2 −
𝜃𝜃) + 2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃) − (1 + 𝛥𝛥)2(4 − 𝜃𝜃)2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃 + 16𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)2 , 𝜃𝜃21 ≈ 0.39 and 
satisfies 𝐹𝐹11(𝜃𝜃21,𝛥𝛥 = 1 − 𝜃𝜃21) = 0 , 𝜃𝜃22 ≈ 0.5803 and satisfies 𝐹𝐹11(𝜃𝜃22,𝛥𝛥 = 2 −




𝐹𝐹�22 , when 𝜃𝜃21 < 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃22 , there exists 𝐹𝐹11(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥21) = 0  and satisfies 𝛥𝛥21 =
(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(8−(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)+2�(4−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃2(12−(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(5−2𝜃𝜃))
16−(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(8−(5−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥21, 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�22, else, 𝐹𝐹�12 >
𝐹𝐹�22. 
Since 𝐹𝐹�13 − 𝐹𝐹�21 =
−(1−𝜃𝜃)2(2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)2−𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(−4+(4+𝛥𝛥)𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)
, we let 𝐹𝐹12(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥) =




1 − 𝜃𝜃� = 0, 𝐹𝐹12 �
9−√17
8
,𝛥𝛥 = 2 − 2𝜃𝜃� = 0, when 𝜃𝜃 > 9−√17
8
, 𝐹𝐹�13 > 𝐹𝐹�21, when 𝜃𝜃 <
5−√17
2
, 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�21 , when 
5−√17
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 9−√17
8
, there exists 𝛥𝛥22 =
−2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃−�(4−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃3
−4+(4−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥22, 𝐹𝐹�13 > 𝐹𝐹�21, else, 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�21. 
Since 𝐹𝐹�21 − 𝐹𝐹�22 =
4(2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)−(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃(1+𝛥𝛥)2+16𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)
16(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
, we let 𝐹𝐹13(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥) =
4(2𝛥𝛥 + 𝜃𝜃)2(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − (4 − 𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃(1 + 𝛥𝛥)2 + 16𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃), 𝜃𝜃23 ≈ 0.288 and satisfies 
𝐹𝐹13(𝜃𝜃23,𝛥𝛥 = 1 − 𝜃𝜃23) = 0 , 𝜃𝜃24 ≈ 0.336 and satisfies 𝐹𝐹13(𝜃𝜃24,𝛥𝛥 = 1) = 0 , when 
𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃24, 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�22, when 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃23, 𝐹𝐹�21 > 𝐹𝐹�22, when 𝜃𝜃23 < 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃24, there exists 
𝐹𝐹13(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥23) = 0 and satisfies 𝛥𝛥23 = −
8𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃3+2𝜃𝜃�(1−𝜃𝜃)(32+𝜃𝜃(20−(8−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃))
−16+𝜃𝜃(32−(8−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)
, if 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥23, 
𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�22, else, 𝐹𝐹�21 > 𝐹𝐹�22. 
In conclusion, we obtain the results in Table 3. 
We then consider the condition that 2 − 2𝜃𝜃 < ∆≤ 1 ∩ 𝜃𝜃 > 1
2
, thus, when in the 
certification-no certification scenario, the retailer will only procure the products from 
supplier 1; when in the no certification-certification scenario, the retailer will only 
procure the products from supplier 2. 
By equating 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗  and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛∗ , we get the threshold certification cost 𝐹𝐹�21 =
(2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃






equating 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗  and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦∗ , we get 𝐹𝐹�33 =
(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥+2)2
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2
; by equating 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛∗  and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ , 
we get 𝐹𝐹�22 =
(1+𝛥𝛥)2
16
− 1−𝜃𝜃(4−𝜃𝜃)2 . Then, we get 𝐹𝐹
�21 − 𝐹𝐹�34 =
−𝜃𝜃
16(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
�8𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃3 +
𝛥𝛥2(8 + 𝜃𝜃) + 2𝛥𝛥(8 + 𝜃𝜃2)� < 0 , 𝐹𝐹�33 − 𝐹𝐹�22 =
16−4𝛥𝛥(4+3𝛥𝛥)−24𝜃𝜃+4𝛥𝛥2𝜃𝜃−(1+𝛥𝛥)2𝜃𝜃2
16(4−𝜃𝜃)2




Since 𝐹𝐹�21 − 𝐹𝐹�33 =
�𝛥𝛥2−𝜃𝜃�(4−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃
，thus if 𝛥𝛥 < √𝜃𝜃, 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�33; if 𝛥𝛥 > √𝜃𝜃, 𝐹𝐹�21 >
𝐹𝐹�33 . 𝐹𝐹�21 − 𝐹𝐹�22 =
−(1+𝛥𝛥)2(4−𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃+16(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃+4(1−𝜃𝜃)(2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)2
16𝜃𝜃(4−𝜃𝜃)2
< 0 , 𝐹𝐹�34 − 𝐹𝐹�22 =
(1−𝜃𝜃)�𝛥𝛥2(4−𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃2�
16𝜃𝜃(4−𝜃𝜃)
> 0. Thus, we get the results in Table 4. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
When two suppliers both certify the product, we get that 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ =
(1−𝜃𝜃)(−𝛥𝛥2+𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, if 𝛥𝛥 < √𝜃𝜃, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ > 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ ; if 𝛥𝛥 > √𝜃𝜃, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ < 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ . When two suppliers do 
not certify the product, we get that 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ =
1−𝜃𝜃
4(4−𝜃𝜃)
> 0. To realize 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ < 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ , the 
condition 𝜃𝜃 < 3−√5
2
 and √𝜃𝜃 < ∆< 1 − 𝜃𝜃 must be satisfied. We find 𝛥𝛥11 < 𝛥𝛥12 <
√𝜃𝜃 , but there exists 𝜃𝜃31  satisfying 𝛥𝛥13(𝜃𝜃31) = �𝜃𝜃31 , 𝜃𝜃31 ≈ 0.263 ,𝛥𝛥13 > √𝜃𝜃  if 
𝜃𝜃31 < 𝜃𝜃 <
7−√41
2
. Thus, if two suppliers reach 1-1 equilibrium, supplier 2 may obtain 
more profits than supplier 1 if 𝜃𝜃 < 7−√41
2





 in Case (3). When 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹�12 in Cases (2)-(4), two suppliers achieve 0-1 
equilibrium, we get 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ = 𝐹𝐹 −
𝛥𝛥2+2𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃







((−4 + 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)2𝜃𝜃 − 2𝛥𝛥(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃2 + 𝛥𝛥2(4 − 𝜃𝜃(5 − (3 −
𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃))), if 𝑓𝑓6(∆) > 0, we get 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ < 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ in a 0-1 equilibrium. 𝑓𝑓6(𝜃𝜃32,∆= 1 − 𝜃𝜃32) =
0, 𝜃𝜃32 ≈ 0.484, if 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃32, 𝑓𝑓6(∆= 1 − 𝜃𝜃) < 0, thus, 𝑓𝑓6(∆) < 0. 𝑓𝑓6(∆= 𝛥𝛥11) < 0, 
𝑓𝑓6(𝜃𝜃33,∆= 𝛥𝛥12) = 0 , 𝜃𝜃33 ≈ 0.403 , if 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃33 , 𝑓𝑓6(∆= 𝛥𝛥12) > 0 , else, 𝑓𝑓6(∆=
𝛥𝛥12) < 0. 𝑓𝑓6(𝜃𝜃34,∆= 𝛥𝛥13) = 0 , 𝜃𝜃34 ≈ 0.243 , if 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃34 , 𝑓𝑓6(∆= 𝛥𝛥13) > 0 , else, 




Cases (3) and (4), 7−√41
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 5−√17
2
 in Cases (2) and (3) and if 5−√17
2
< 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃32 
in Case (2). When 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹�13  in Cases (1)-(3), two suppliers achieve 1-0 
equilibrium, we get 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠1∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠2∗ =
(1+𝛥𝛥)2−𝜃𝜃
4(4−𝜃𝜃)










Appendix C. The equilibrium certification strategy. 
Case (1) 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, supplier 1(2) always chooses certification regardless of the choice of 
supplier 2(1), thus they will reach the certification–certification Nash equilibrium, to 
simplify the exposition, we denote the equilibrium as 1(dominant)-1(dominant); if 
𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, supplier 1 always chooses certification regardless of the choice of 
supplier 2, supplier 2 will choose no certification if supplier 1 chooses certification, 
thus they will reach the certification–no certification Nash equilibrium, we denote the 
equilibrium as 1(dominant)-0; if 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13 , they will reach 1(dominant)-0 
(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, they will reach 1-0(dominant) Nash 
equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�14, they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) Nash equilibrium. 
Case (2) 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�14 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�11 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-0 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12,they will 
reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, they will reach 1-0 (dominant) 
Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�14 , they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) Nash 
equilibrium. 
Case (3) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�12 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, they will 
reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, they will reach 0 (dominant)-1 
Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�12 , they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) Nash 
equilibrium. 
Case (4) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�14, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�11, they will 
reach 0(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, they will reach 





Case (5) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�12 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21,they will 
reach 0(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, they will reach 
0 (dominant)-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�12 , they will reach 
0(dominant)-0(dominant) Nash equilibrium. 
Case (6) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹�12  
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, they 
will reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12 , they will reach 0 
(dominant)-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�12, they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) 
Nash equilibrium. 
Case (7) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�22 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12,they will 
reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, they will reach 1-0 (dominant) 
Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�22 , they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) Nash 
equilibrium. 
Case (8) 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹�22 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21 , they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 
𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�13, they will reach 1(dominant)-0 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�12, 
they will reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�12 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, they will reach 1-0 
(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�22, they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) 
Nash equilibrium. 
Case (9) 𝐹𝐹�33 < 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹�34 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�33 , they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 
𝐹𝐹�33 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21, they will reach 0-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, 
they will reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�34, they will reach 0 





Case (10) 𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹�33 < 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹�34 
If 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�21 , they will reach 1(dominant)-1(dominant) Nash equilibrium; if 
𝐹𝐹�21 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�33, they will reach 1(dominant)-0 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�33 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�22, 
they will reach 1-0 or 0-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹�22 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�34, they will reach 0 
(dominant)-1 Nash equilibrium; if 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹�34, they will reach 0(dominant)-0(dominant) 
Nash equilibrium. 
Each of above cases can be divided into 5 parts with the increase of 𝐹𝐹, we 
denote five parts in each case as the first part, second part ~ fifth part, respectively, 
which show that two suppliers will reach 1-1 equilibrium in the first part, and reach 
0-0 equilibrium in the fifth part. 
Appendix D. The certification and pricing decisions considering 
production cost. 
We incorporate the production cost into the model, and analyze the certification 
and pricing decisions in a simultaneous game. We mainly focus on the condition when 
the retailer will always procure two products regardless of their certification strategy. 
When 𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆








































((1− 𝜃𝜃)((𝑐𝑐2 + 𝜃𝜃)(2 + 𝜃𝜃) − 6𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃) + 𝛥𝛥2(2 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃𝜁𝜁12 + 2𝛥𝛥(1 −
𝜃𝜃)(𝜃𝜃 − 2𝑐𝑐)𝜁𝜁2 + 𝛥𝛥2(2 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜁𝜁22 + 2𝛥𝛥𝜃𝜃𝜁𝜁1((2 − 𝑐𝑐)(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝛥𝛥𝜁𝜁2)).   
After substituting 𝑝𝑝1∗ and 𝑝𝑝2∗ into the constraint 
𝑝𝑝2−ζ2∆
𝑝𝑝1−ζ1∆
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 +
(ζ1 − ζ2)∆, we get the following conditions under which the retailer will 
simultaneously procure two products. 
In scenario 1, if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃
2
， the retailer will procure two products simultaneously, 
otherwise, he will only procure product 1; in scenario II, if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝜃(1−𝛥𝛥−𝜃𝜃)
2(1−𝜃𝜃)
, the retailer 
will procure two products simultaneously, otherwise, he will only procure product 1; 
in scenario III, if 𝛥𝛥 ≥ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 and  𝑐𝑐 ≤ 2(2−𝛥𝛥−2𝜃𝜃)
2(1−𝜃𝜃)
， the retailer will procure two 
products simultaneously, otherwise, he will only procure product 2; if 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 and 
 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 2𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃(𝛥𝛥+𝜃𝜃)
2(1−𝜃𝜃)
, the retailer will procure two products simultaneously, otherwise, he 
will only procure product 1; in scenario IV, if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝜃
2
, the retailer will procure two 
products simultaneously, otherwise, he will only procure product 1. We mainly focus 
on the condition of 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 − 2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑠𝑠
𝜃𝜃
, and we get 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝜃
2




For supplier 2, given that supplier 1 adopts certification, supplier 2 adopts 
certification if 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�41 =
𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(𝛥𝛥(2−3𝜃𝜃)+(2𝜃𝜃−4𝑠𝑠)(1−𝜃𝜃))
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, otherwise no certification; 




, otherwise no certification. For supplier 1, given 
that supplier 2 adopts certification, supplier 1 adopts certification if 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�43 =
𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(4−2𝑠𝑠(1−𝜃𝜃)−(4+𝛥𝛥)𝜃𝜃)
4(−4+𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)
, otherwise no certification; given that supplier 2 adopts no 
certification, supplier 1 adopts certification if  
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹�44 =
𝛥𝛥(2−𝜃𝜃)(2(2+𝛥𝛥)−2𝑠𝑠(1−𝜃𝜃)−(4+𝛥𝛥)𝜃𝜃)
4(4−𝜃𝜃)2(1−𝜃𝜃)



















, we let 𝐹𝐹41(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥) = 𝛥𝛥(2 − 3𝜃𝜃) + (2𝜃𝜃 − 4𝑐𝑐)(1 − 𝜃𝜃) −

















, we let 
𝐹𝐹43(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥) = 𝛥𝛥(2 − 3𝜃𝜃) + (2𝜃𝜃 − 4𝑐𝑐)(1 − 𝜃𝜃) , we let 𝐹𝐹41 �𝜃𝜃, 1 − 𝜃𝜃 −
2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑠𝑠1
𝜃𝜃




; 𝐹𝐹42 �𝜃𝜃, 1 − 𝜃𝜃 −
2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑠𝑠2
𝜃𝜃




𝐹𝐹43 �𝜃𝜃, 1 − 𝜃𝜃 −
2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑠𝑠3
𝜃𝜃
� = 0  and 𝑐𝑐3 =
𝜃𝜃�𝜃𝜃2−5𝜃𝜃+2�
2(2−𝜃𝜃)
; 𝐹𝐹41(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥41) = 0  and 𝛥𝛥41 =
2(𝑠𝑠(2−𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)
2−(1−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
; 𝐹𝐹42(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥42) = 0 and 𝛥𝛥42 = 2𝑐𝑐 +
2𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃
; 𝐹𝐹43(𝜃𝜃,𝛥𝛥43) = 0 and 𝛥𝛥43 =
2(𝑠𝑠(2−𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)
2−(5−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃
, 𝛥𝛥41 < 𝛥𝛥42 < 𝛥𝛥43, then, we get Table 5. 
Table 5. The organic certification strategy when 𝛥𝛥 ≤ 1 − 𝜃𝜃 − 2(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑠𝑠
𝜃𝜃
. 




𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐1  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥41 (11)  
𝛥𝛥41 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥42  (12)  
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥42 (13) 
𝑐𝑐1 < 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐3  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥41 (11) 
𝛥𝛥41 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥42  (12) 
𝛥𝛥42 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥43  (13)  
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥43 (14) 
𝑐𝑐3 < 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐2  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥41 (11) 
𝛥𝛥41 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥43 (12) 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥43 (14) 




𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥43 (11) 




𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐3  𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥41 (11) 
𝛥𝛥41 < 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥42 (12) 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥42 (13) 
𝑐𝑐3 < 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐2 𝛥𝛥 < 𝛥𝛥41 (11) 
𝛥𝛥 > 𝛥𝛥41 (12) 









(1); (12) 𝐹𝐹�41 < 𝐹𝐹�43 < 𝐹𝐹�42 < 𝐹𝐹�44, the certification strategy here is similar to that in 
Case (2); (13) 𝐹𝐹�43 < 𝐹𝐹�41 < 𝐹𝐹�44 < 𝐹𝐹�12, the certification strategy here is similar to that 
in Case (3); (14) 𝐹𝐹�13 < 𝐹𝐹�14 < 𝐹𝐹�11 < 𝐹𝐹�12, the certification strategy here is similar to 
that in Case (4). 
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